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SYMPOSIUM:  ERIE UNDER ADVISEMENT:   
THE DOCTRINE AFTER SHADY GROVE 
 
DEFINING THE WORD “MAINTAIN”; CONTEXT COUNTS 
Jack Friedenthal* 
Let us assume that a major New York corporation with one of its 
manufacturing plants in Vermont determines to eliminate 500 of its 
employees, all of whom are employees at will.  The purpose of the 
layoff is to cut costs because the company’s profits have declined 
substantially in a down market. 
A number of the Vermont employees seek the advice of a Vermont 
attorney to determine if they may have their employment status restored.  
The lawyer erroneously decides that the workers have a valid case under 
Vermont law.  A class action, based on diversity of citizenship, is 
brought in the Vermont federal court, requesting equitable relief.  The 
federal trial court immediately dismisses the case on the ground that the 
plaintiffs have no substantive cause of action.  Sounds simple. 
But wait a minute—plaintiff’s attorney points to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23.1  He notes that all the “prerequisites” of Rule 23(a) 
are met and that the case also meets the requirements of Rule 23(b).  The 
attorney then notes the language of Rule 23(b), which says that a “class 
action may be maintained” if Rules 23(a) and (b) are met.2  He argues 
that The Oxford English Dictionary gives as one of sixteen definitions of 
the word “maintain” to mean “to carry on (an action at law); to have 
ground for sustaining (an action).” 3  Therefore, he argues that under the 
 
* Jack H. Friedenthal, Howrey Professor of Trial Advocacy, Litigation & Professional 
Responsibility. 
 1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 2. Id. (emphasis added). 
 3. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2000), available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/112562?rskey=kKnvXT&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid 
(emphasis added). 
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specific terms of Rule 23, the case can continue and be submitted to a 
jury for a determination. 
The attorney’s proposed result in our hypothetical is, of course, 
absurd, but that is true only because in context that is not what Rule 23 
means by the term “maintain.”  To understand what a word means, 
especially one such as “maintain” that has multiple formal definitions, 
one must consider the background and purpose for which it is utilized.  
With regard to Rule 23 in a diversity of citizenship case, one must define 
the word in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, requiring federal courts to apply state 
substantive law, 4 the Rules Enabling Act, prohibiting federal procedural 
rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” 5 and the 
background and purpose of Rule 23.  Given these factors, an 
interpretation of the word “maintain” to permit a direct alteration of the 
state substantive law would not only be improper, but would raise 
significant questions as to the validity of the rule. 
Unfortunately, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.,6 Justice Scalia, writing for himself and three others,7 does 
not appear to recognize that the word “maintain” has significant different 
meanings depending upon the context in which it is used.8  When faced 
with an argument that Rule 23 has separate meanings and must be 
interpreted not to overstep the Rules Enabling Act, he responded, “If the 
Rule were susceptible to two meanings—one that would violate § 
2072(b) and another that would no—we would agree . . . but it is not.  
Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any plaintiff, in any federal civil 
proceeding, to maintain a class action if the Rule’s prerequisites are 
met.”9  That statement is meaningless until one analyzes and understands 
the proper interpretation of the word “maintain” in the context used.  It 
cannot be said that all one has to do is to read the words as printed in the 
rule, because, as we have seen in the above hypothetical, “maintenance” 
of a case, without understanding the context and purpose, could have an 
entirely different meaning—one that has a definite substantive aspect 
that would allow a plaintiff’s case to go forward in direct opposition to 
the applicable substantive law.   
 
 4.  Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 68 (1938). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934). 
 6. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 7. Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.  Id. at 
1436-48.  Justice Sotomayor also joined that portion of the opinion relevant to the above discussion.  
Id. at 1442-44. 
 8. See id. at 1437-42. 
 9. Id. at 1441-42 (emphasis original) (internal citations omitted). 
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In Shady Grove, a diversity case in a federal court, the Supreme 
Court was required to determine whether a New York statute conflicted 
with Federal Rule 23.10  That statute reads: 
Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure 
of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class 
action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of 
recovery created or imposed by statute may not be maintained as a 
class action.11 
 If the statute is merely a procedural limitation on class suits that 
conflicts with Rule 23, then of course, in a case in a federal court, the 
federal rule controls.12  But if the New York provision is designed only 
to eliminate a class’ right to relief to obtain redress for a penalty, it is a 
substantive provision that does not conflict with Rule 23 and must be 
applied by the federal court.13  Here, Justice Scalia makes it very clear 
that we care not at all what was meant by the New York legislature when 
it enacted the provision.14  All we care about is what the legislation says!  
In responding to the argument of the dissent,15 a cogent analysis based 
on evidence of the New York legislature’s purpose, he states that such 
analysis “cannot override the statute’s clear text.”16  But what is that 
“clear text”?  Justice Scalia merely adopts, without discussion or 
analysis, one of the various meanings of the word “maintained”:  “By its 
terms, the [New York] provision precludes a plaintiff from 
‘maintain[ing]’ a class action seeking statutory penalties . . . . [I]t 
prevents the class actions it covers from coming into existence at all.”17  
Thus, he attributes the same meaning to “maintained” in the New York 
law as it has in Federal Rule 23.18  Under that assumption, the two 
conflict and the state rule must be ignored.19  But is that position at all 
legitimate?  Assume that we accept his general view that we should not 
 
 10. Id. at 1436. 
 11. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 1975). 
 12. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).  
 13. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.  See also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 (“Federal courts sitting 
in diversity cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state court decisions 
as well as state statutes.”). 
 14. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440. 
 15. Id. at 1464-65 (dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kennedy, 
Breyer, and Alito). 
 16. Id. at 1440. 
 17. Id. at 1439. 
 18. Id. (“Both of § 901’s subsections undeniably answer the same question as Rule 23:  
whether a class action may proceed for a given suit.”). 
 19. See id. at 1442. 
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try to ascertain the underlying purpose of legislation on the basis that to 
do so is too complex and time consuming for the federal courts.20 
Nevertheless when we are left only to deal with the words written, aren’t 
we at least bound to find some rational way to decide what those words 
mean in the context they are used, especially when the words are subject 
to different interpretations?  The Supreme Court itself, as late as 2003, 
struggled with the ambiguity of the word “maintain.”  As stated in 
Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc.:  
[T]he word “maintain” enjoys a breadth of meaning . . . “To maintain 
an action” may mean “to continue” to litigate, as opposed to 
“commence” an action.  Black’s Law Dictionary 1143 (3d ed. 1933).  
But “maintain” in reference to a legal action is often read as “bring” or 
“file”; “[t]o maintain an action or suit may mean to commence or 
institute it; the term imports the existence of a cause of action.” 21 
Is it justifiable for members of the Court merely to adopt an 
interpretation convenient to their thesis without consideration of the 
surrounding factors that could give us quite a different result?  
I submit that the New York statute does not “clearly” state that a 
class action for a penalty cannot, in Justice Scalia’s words, “[come] into 
existence at all,”22 and his opinion provides no reason why one should 
read the word “maintain” to convey such a procedural meaning.  It is 
certainly arguable that “maintain” means no more than that a plaintiff 
class has no substantive cause of action for a penalty.  If that is the case, 
then of course, a class action for a penalty can be pleaded in federal 
court and if it meets the requirements of Rule 23, it can, indeed must, be 
dealt with as a class action.  But that is as far as Rule 23 goes.  The fact 
that a class action meets the requirements of Rule 23 and thus can be 
“maintained” in a procedural sense certainly does not mean that the case, 
or a portion of it, cannot be dismissed on the merits.23  Federal Rule 23 
cannot create a cause of action in a diversity case if no such cause exists 
under state law. 
Therefore, it should have been incumbent on Justice Scalia and the 
three other justices who joined his opinion in Shady Grove to decide 
exactly what the state statute means when it uses the ambiguous word 
“maintain.”  And that requires analysis that is missing from Justice 
Scalia’s opinion. 
 
 20. Id. at 1440-41. 
 21. Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 695 (2003). 
 22. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439. 
 23. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
